We study how shocks to the forward-looking expectations of investors buying call and put options transmit across the financial system. We introduce a new contagion measure, called asymmetric fear connectedness (AFC), which captures the information related to "fear" on the two sides of the options market and can be used as a forward-looking systemic risk monitoring tool. The decomposed connectedness measures provide timely predictive information for near-future macroeconomic conditions and uncertainty indicators, and they contain additional valuable information that is not included in the aggregate connectedness measure. The role of a positive/negative "fear" transmitter/receiver emerges clearly when we focus more closely on idiosyncratic events for financial institutions. We identify banks that are predominantly positive/negative receivers of "fear", as well as banks that positively/negatively transmit "fear" in the financial system.
Introduction
Different expectations about future values of stocks extracted from call and put options influence system-wide beliefs in the financial market. A shock to forward-looking market views associated with call options may then propagate through the system with a different strength than a similar shock to put options information. The unequal impact of "fears" spreading into the system may create asymmetric connections within the financial sector. In this paper, we highlight the connections' asymmetry on both sides of the stock options market, and we introduce a new connectedness measure derived from the implied volatility extracted from individual financial institutions'
options. This tool can be beneficial for monitoring the level of "fear" connectedness in the financial sector by exploiting forward-looking investors' expectations. In particular, we would like to answer the following important research question: "is there any signal relevant to economic downturns in the financial sector embedded in the asymmetric fear connections?" To answer this question, we first produce a new dataset of daily implied volatilitytype measures from call options only and put options only, respectively. Then, we assemble a new asymmetric fear connectedness index that is used as a forward-looking systemic risk monitoring tool.
Our main focus on the connectedness of the main U.S. financial stocks is motivated by the idea that financial institutions have always been under the magnifying glass of investors, practitioners and academics for their pivotal role in systemic risk terms 1 . De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) and pointed out that the financial sector's systemic risk exposure may lead to macroeconomic decline and macroeconomic contagion, so it should be closely monitored. Systemic risk in the financial sector has been identified to predict future economic downturns . In our work, we consider forward-looking information embedded in implied volatility measures extracted from stock call and put options prices. Comparison of the both sides of the market yields an important insight about asymmetric views of market participants about future volatility of the U.S. financial sector that can be used to predict economic downturns as well as periods of exuberance.
The methodological framework for measuring connectedness is anchored in the financial connectedness literature, which is spanned by Yilmaz (2009, 2012) ; Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) ;s seminal papers. While the literature on volatility spillover and contagion is immense (see Bae et al., 2003; Engle et al., 2012; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Bekaert et al., 2014; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2015) or Gagnon and Karolyi (2006) for an excellent survey, quantifying connectedness via variance decompositions from a vector autoregression approximation model has attracted a great deal of attention recently. Previous literature relies on historical volatility measures, but we believe that a more informative analysis can be achieved by employing information from the stock option prices of individual companies, such that forward-looking measures can be calculated for "fear connectedness".
Call and put options carry different information; hence, we further decompose the individual bank's "fear" index VIX into positive and negative components extracted from calls and puts only (henceforth denoted as VIX + and VIX − , respectively). In this paper, we refer to "fear" connectedness when fear is generated by the aggregated VIX index, well known as the "fear" index in the literature. Thus, in order not to detach this label from the decomposed implied volatility indexes, we denote positive "fear" connectedness when fear is generated by VIX + and negative "fear" connectedness when fear is generated by VIX − .
We derive the asymmetric fear connectedness (AFC) index from stock option prices and study the interdependence among market expectations about individual institutions to see how they are connected within the financial system network. The "fear" contagion within the financial system depends on the structure of the financial network, its integration and diversification (see Elliott et al., 2014) . Thus, we investigate the structural characteristics of the system focusing on directional implied volatility (or "fear" ) connectedness. The paper is also related to a growing strand of literature studying the asymmetric characteristics of volatility (see Barndorff-Nielsen et al., 2010; Patton and Sheppard, 2015; Segal et al., 2015; Feunou et al., 2017; Kilic and Shaliastovich, 2018) .
The main contribution in this paper is the construction of a forward-looking monitoring tool extracted from stock option prices, that is, an asymmetric fear connectedness measure. When constructed from put options only, the new measure reflects investors' negative future expectations associated with "bad" volatility (e.g., Segal et al., 2015) , which could be linked to a possible decrease in economic growth and equity value and an increase in uncertainty (see Baruník et al., 2016; Feunou et al., 2017) . Moreover, in some cases, volatility may reflect a positive direction associated with events that may trigger higher returns (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2015) 2 . Thus, there might be some events related to U.S. financial institutions that could be considered harmful because they increase "bad" volatility and can transmit across the system, creating the negative connectedness. However, other events that will increase "good" volatility and transmit across the system can create positive connectedness (see Segal et al., 2015; Baruník et al., 2016; Feunou et al., 2017) . For instance, Kilic and Shaliastovich (2018) found a "synergy" between the good and bad components of the variance risk premium when they are included in the same model, increasing return predicability compared to the aggregate measure of the variance premium. In addition, they found that the variance premium decomposition uncovers long-horizon return predictability, where the aggregate variance premium fails instead.
Since connectedness measures may be directly related to network theory and to systemic risk measures (Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014) , this study also contributes to the systemic risk literature. Fundamental information transmission from one bank to another has also been considered as a source of banks' connectedness. Correlated returns among banks can make depositors and investors run from one bank to another, generating panic (Chen, 1999) . Banks might be further linked through deposits or asset liquidity (see Dasgupta, 2004; Cespa and Foucault, 2014) . Systemic risk may also come from the interaction between asset commonality and funding maturity through an informational channel. This systemic risk is higher, especially when bad information about banks' future solvency arrives in the economy and the asset structures are clustered (see . All these market situations can be better understood in a more general framework for banks' information contagion based on volatility, since good or bad news in relation to the bank influences the banks' stock volatility.
In contrast to the previous literature measuring systemic risk, we provide an ex ante systemic risk alarm bell extracted from the individual U.S. financial stock option prices in order to anticipate the propagation of systemic risk in the financial sector 3 . Baruník and Křehlík (2018) argue that changes in investors' expectations will have a significant impact on the market. Thus, by considering decomposed implied volatility indexes, we can shed new light on directional forward-looking connectedness measures.
We focus on the separate behavior of the connectedness of single equity VIX indexes. Our analysis indicates that the negative implied volatility inflates mainly during turbulent periods, reflecting "fear" among investors.
Employing the asymmetric fear connectedness measure for the ten main U.S. financial institutions, we identify a clear predominance of "fear" connectedness coming from positive implied volatility. We examine the predictive power of our connectedness measures with respect to macroeconomic and uncertainty indicators in the spirit of , and we find that the decomposed fear connectedness measures perform better than the aggregate measure and they can predict future economic activity, recession and VIX level. We also provide a ranking of the top ten financial institutions in the U.S. by classifying them into net positive or net negative transmitters or receivers. In addition, we confirm the different roles played by VIX + and VIX − on the net fear connectedness indexes, especially when we focus on specific company events.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and it illustrates the calculation of the individual financial stocks' implied volatility indexes and their decomposition into positive and negative measures. Section 3 introduces the computation of ex ante asymmetric fear connectedness measure. Section 4 reports the results for the static and dynamic analyses in relation to the aggregate implied volatility measures, while
Section 5 shows the static and dynamic results with regards to the positive and negative asymmetric measures. In Section 6, a series of results are reported, highlighting the predictive power of the "fear" connectedness measures for future levels of economic indicators and uncertainty proxies. In addition, we also investigate the net positive and net negative connectedness for specific financial institutions. The results are presented in Appendix C. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Data and Implied Volatility Decomposition
Implied volatility reveals the market's expectations and is often used as an ex ante measure of investor sentiment.
Since we aim to measure the ex ante connectedness of the U.S. financial sector, we apply the VIX methodology (see CBOE, 2009) to create a proxy "VIX Index" for the ten main U.S. banks in our system.
Data on U.S. Financial Institutions
The study focuses on the following ten major financial institutions representing the financial sector of the U.S. The same set of firms has already been studied in the previous literature (see Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014; Baruník and Křehlík, 2018) and, therefore, by keeping the same sample, we can compare our findings to those of previous studies. The dataset ranges from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017, covering the most recent crisis and the remarkable boom that occurred after the crisis. Our sample contains 4528 daily observations for each series. 
Individual Positive and Negative Implied Volatilities of U.S. Financial Institutions
We apply the CBOE VIX index methodology as described in CBOE (2009) to a set of out-of-the-money (OTM) financial stocks options for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. We compute the individual equity VIX index for the j = 1, . . . , 10 banks
where T is time to expiration, F is the forward index level derived from the put-call parity as F = e rT [c(K, T ) − p(K, T )] + K with the risk-free rate r 5 , K 0 is the reference price, the first exercise price less or equal to the forward level F (K 0 ≤ F ), and K i is the ith OTM strike price available on a specific date (call if K i > K 0 , put if K i < K 0 , and both call and put if
is the average bid-ask of OTM options with exercise price equal to K i . If K i = K 0 , it will be equal to the average between the ATM call and put price, relative to the strike price, and ∆(K i ) is the sum divided by two of the two nearest prices to the exercise price K 0 , namely,
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. An interpolation between two expiration dates σ 2 VIXj (T 1 ) and σ 2 VIXj (T 2 ) yields the equity VIX index for the jth stock
In order to compute the positive and negative components of the single stock VIX j , we consider call options and put options separately. Using call options (i.e., K i ≥ K 0 ) in the equation (1) will allow us to define a positive implied volatility index for a given stock VIX + j . Employing put options instead (i.e., K i ≤ K 0 ) in the equation
(1) will allow us to define a negative implied volatility index for a given stock VIX − j . Hence, we obtain three daily 5 The risk-free interest rate is considered as average of T 1 and T 2 ; thus, we use the U.S. 1-month T-Bill (commonly referred to as 1-month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate and based on the U.S. Treasury yield curve rates) collected from FRED and matched on the expiration dates of the financial stock options. implied volatility indexes: VIX j , VIX + j , and VIX − j for every bank considered in our sample.
Defining the sub-sample of options with strike prices above the reference price as K + i and the sub-sample below the reference price as K − i , corresponding positive and negative variances are calculated as
Finally, the two implied volatility components VIX + j and VIX − j are determined from the following formulae
which are related to the VIX through the following approximate relationship 6 : VIX Figure A1 in the Appendix A.
Having computed an implied volatility index for the individual banks, we also define a financial sector implied volatility index (WVIX), reflecting the ten main stock volatility indexes. This index is computed as the sum of their single stock VIX weighted for their average market capitalizations as
where w j are the weights based on the 2000-2017 average market capitalizations, as shown in Table 1 , and VIX j represents the aggregate implied volatility index. Analogous positive and negative implied volatility measures WVIX + and WVIX − can be computed from equation (7) using VIX + j and VIX − j instead of VIX j , respectively.
The WVIX indexes, namely, aggregate, positive and negative are plotted in Figure 1 . Even though the main component of the aggregate single stock VIX is generated by the call options, most of the time, we observe 6 We decided not to weight negative information extracted from puts more than positive information extracted from calls. For this reason, this relationship is not always exact, as when VIX index is decomposed, K i = K 0 might result in an ATM options price that is excluded from calculations of the VIX − or VIX + measures on one or another side of the distribution, whereas for the aggregate VIX , it is always taken into account in the total distribution of prices as the average between the ATM call and put prices relative to the strike price. that in the case of financial market downturns, the negative component also increases in size, overpowering the positive component. The figure also shows that before the financial crisis, the implied positive volatility is found to be above the implied negative volatility, whereas the two decomposed implied volatility series become more intertwined in the post-crisis period, highlighting the role of implied negative volatility during crises and reflecting the investors' increasing concern for other potentially similar events. This characteristic is also supported by the graphs illustrated in Figure A1 in the Appendix A.
Asymmetric Fear Connectedness
System connectedness can be characterized well through variance decompositions from a vector autoregression approximation model Yilmaz, 2009, 2012) . Variance decompositions provide useful information about how much of the future variance of variable j is due to shocks in variable k. Aggregating variance decompositions then yields a simple way to measure how the system is interconnected. Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) further argue that variance decompositions are closely linked to modern network theory and recently proposed measures of various types of systemic risk, such as expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2017) and CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016) . However, the literature as a whole examines how shocks to volatility measured ex post are transmitted across the system. Employing forward-looking implied volatility measures, we aim to derive informatively different measures of interconnectedness. Option prices reflect market participants' expectations of future movements of the underlying asset; hence, volatility implied by option prices carry forward-looking information superior to ex post volatility (see Christensen and Prabhala, 1998) . Individual equity VIX indexes as derived in the previous section essentially measure the risk-neutral expected volatility. We are naturally interested in knowing how a shock to the expected volatility of a stock j will transmit to future expectations about the volatility of a stock k. Aggregating this information can provide a system-wide measure of forward-looking connectedness that will measure how strongly the investors' expectations are interconnected.
To construct the asymmetric fear connectedness measures, we use the implied volatility indexes computed for the main financial institutions in combination with connectedness measures based on generalized variance decompositions of a vector autoregressive (VAR) approximation model due to Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) . In particular, we consider a covariance stationary N -variate process VIX * t = (VIX * 1,t , . . . , VIX * N,t ) at t = 1, . . . , T described by the VAR model of order p as
with Φ 1 , . . . , Φ p coefficient matrices, and t being white noise with a (possibly non-diagonal) covariance matrix Σ. In this model, each variable is regressed on its own p lags, as well as the p lags of all of the other variables in the system; hence, matrices of the coefficients contain complete information about the connections between variables.
It is useful to work with 
where Ψ h is a (N × N ) matrix of moving average coefficients at lag h defined above, and
denotes the contribution of the kth variable to the variance of forecast error of the element j, at horizon h. As the rows of the variance decomposition matrix θ H do not necessarily sum to one, each entry is normalized by the row sum as provides a pairwise measure of connectedness from j to k at horizon H. The connectedness measure is then defined as the share of variance in the forecasts contributed by errors other than own errors or as the ratio of the sum of the off-diagonal elements to the sum of the entire matrix (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012 )
Now the
where the denominator signifies the sum of all elements of the θ H matrix. Hence, the connectedness is the relative contribution to the forecast variances from the other variables in the system.
Similarly to the overall aggregate connectedness measure that infers the system-wide connectedness, we can define measures that will reveal when an individual bank in the system is a volatility transmitter or receiver. The directional connectedness that measures how much of each bank's j variance is due to other banks j = k in the system is given by
defining the so-called FROM connectedness. Likewise, the contribution of asset j to variances in other variables is computed as
and this is the so-called TO connectedness. These two measures show how other assets contribute to the risk of asset j, and how asset j contributes to the riskiness of others, respectively. Further, a measure showing the discrepancy between how much of the variance is received, so-called NET connectedness, can be calculated as
The NET connectedness measures whether a bank is inducing more risk than it receives from the other banks in the system. Finally, one might be interested in pairwise relations of risk that can further be described by the PAIRWISE connectedness measure given by
As discussed before, our main aim is to compare the connectedness of investors with fundamentally different beliefs revealed by VIX + and VIX − . In the spirit of Baruník et al. (2016) , who define asymmetric spillover measures based on the ex post realized semivariance, we consider the vectors VIX * t ∈ VIX t , VIX
holding information about aggregate, positive, and negative implied volatility and use it in the framework described above. The measures of respective connectedness C for aggregate fear, C + for positive, and C − negative fear in the system can be readily calculated by using appropriate VIX * measures. When C + = C − , we have asymmetry in connectedness due to different investors' expectations, which we define as the measure of asymmetric fear connectedness (AFC)
In other words, when AFC > 0, connectedness due to VIX + is greater than connectedness due to VIX − , and vice versa. In order to shed new light on the nature and sign of the transmitted or received volatility for every financial institution in the system, we compute the positive directional NET as the difference between positive TO and FROM, as
and the negative directional NET as the difference between negative TO and FROM as
Finally, we compute the asymmetric directional NET as the difference between C + j,NET and C − j,NET as
In computations, we follow the previous literature and use the logarithmic of the volatility series, a forecast horizon of twelve days, and a VAR order equal to four (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012; Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014; Baruník et al., 2016) . We report the static forecast error variance decomposition matrix results both for the aggregate measures and for the decomposed positive and negative measures in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.
These connectedness measures are also studied dynamically over a 200-day rolling window 8 .
Fear Connectedness in the Financial Sector
We begin the empirical analysis by studying the aggregate level of the transmission of shocks to expectations within the financial sector. The unconditional connectedness investigated in subsection 4.1 shows how individual banks contributed to the distribution of "fear" in the financial system between 2000 and 2017. In addition, we will also identify net fear transmitters and net fear receivers in the system. Looking at dynamic connectedness, we follow (subsection 4.2) on the time dynamics of connections. Table 3 reports the static analysis of "fear" connectedness for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. The diagonal values in the Table 3 indicate that the future volatility of a stock is impacted by own shocks to expectations, which range from 29.91% to 56.06%. Furthermore, the off-diagonal elements reveal how "fear" spreads from one bank to other banks in the financial sector. The FROM directional connectedness, which measures the exposure of a single bank j to shocks FROM the system, is similar, in systemic risk terms, to the Marginal Expected Shortfall (M ES j|mkt T +1|T ) (see Acharya et al., 2017) , while the TO connectedness, which measures the contribution of the individual bank TO the volatility spillovers in the system is, instead, similar to the CoVaR measure (∆CoV aR mkt|i T +1|T ) (see Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016) . The CoVar measures the systemic risk contribution conditional on market events to financial firms' events and is Notes: The table contains a decomposition of forecast error variance computed for the aggregate VIX indexes for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. Elements in the off-diagonal entries are the pairwise directional connectedness, while the diagonal elements (in grey) are the financial institutions' own variance. The off-diagonal row and column sum to TO and FROM connectedness, respectively. The NET row at the bottom is the difference between TO and FROM. The bottom-right element is the total connectedness index in the considered system. Selected VAR lags = 4 and Forecast Horizon = 12 days. The selected time period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017. exactly in the opposite direction of MES.
Fear Connectedness: Static Analysis
The pairwise values in the off-diagonal matrix entries indicate the directional connectedness between the two companies crossing that entry. The highest pairwise connectedness appears to be from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley (20.29%). In other words, 20.29% of the future variation of VIX for Morgan Stanley is expected to be generated by the shocks from Goldman Sachs. The second-highest number is in the opposite direction, going from Morgan Stanley to Goldman Sachs (18.29%). The bottom row in the table shows the total directional NET computed as difference between directional TO and directional FROM fear connectedness. A positive difference reveals that the company can be classified as a "fear" transmitter, while a negative number identifies a "fear"
receiver. The main net aggregate "fear" transmitter is found to be Goldman Sachs (44.4%) followed by Morgan Stanley (25.92%). J.P. Morgan Chase and U.S. Bancorp are also net aggregate "fear" transmitters. However, we find that Bank of America, Wells Fargo and PNC Bank are, on average, the main aggregate "fear" receivers in the system. The total "fear" connectedness index, bottom-right element, is found to be equal to 57.61%, which means that, on average, more than half of the implied volatility (or "fears") for these ten main financial institutions has been generated from fear spillovers in the financial system.
Fear Connectedness: Time Dynamics
While the static analysis provides an average overview of the "fear" connectedness within the system, we are further interested in gauging how the aggregate VIX connectedness evolves over time.
Figure 2 illustrates how the total "fear" connectedness index spiked twice in the early 2000s due to several specific news and M&A deals in which some of the banks in our sample were involved and to the burst of the dotcom bubble in March 2000. These events, in addition to others, such as the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Enron scandal and the MCI WorldCom scandal, are found to have increased the total "fear" connectedness index at the end of 
Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
Time-varying NET directional fear connectedness provides a more detailed analysis of the connections among banks. Table 4 reports a cumulative ranking for the directional NET measures, describing the main aggregate "fear" transmitters or receivers within the system. Table 4 documents how the financial institutions change their roles as "fear" transmitters or receivers according to the specific market period. We rank the banks according to their aggregate VIX cumulative net directional connectedness for different time ranges, namely, every year, every two years, in the pre-crisis, during crisis and post-crisis periods and, lastly, over the total time period. Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup are classified as the main aggregate net "fear" transmitters, according to the one-year and two-year cumulative rankings. Notes: The table shows the cumulative net aggregate "fear" receivers and transmitters for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. The aggregate VIX NET measure is computed as the difference between aggregate VIX TO and aggregate VIX FROM measures. When this difference is positive the financial institution can be classified as a net aggregate "fear" transmitter (T), while, when negative, it can be classified as a net aggregate "fear" receiver (R). The ranking is reported for every year and every two years for the pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods and for the total period. For every considered period, the main "fear" transmitters and the main "fear" receivers are highlighted in bold. Selected VAR lags = 4 and Forecast Horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
Bank of New York Mellon, PNC Bank and Bank of America are found to be the main financial institutions receiving "fear" from the system in the one-year and two-year period cumulative ranking. Citigroup and PNC Bank are identified as the main "fear" transmitter and receiver, respectively, in the pre-crisis period. Wells Fargo and Bank of America are the main transmitter and receiver, respectively, during the global financial crisis and Goldman Sachs and Bank of New York Mellon the main transmitter and receiver, respectively, post-crisis. Over the whole period, we observe that the main "fear" transmitters are Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan Chase, while the main "fear" receivers are Bank of New York Mellon and Bank of America. Figure ? ? in Appendix B further complements the analysis as it plots the time dynamics of the aggregate directional connectedness. In the next Section 5, we study whether the financial institutions' roles are confirmed when we take into account positive and negative implied volatility indexes. Although the strength of connection is lower, Goldman Sachs is still found to be the main "fear" transmitter in the system (19.33%), followed by Citigroup (9.05%). Morgan Stanley is detected as a positive "fear" receiver (-2.37%). We also find U.S. Bancorp to be a positive "fear" transmitter, while J.P. Morgan Chase is found to be a "fear" receiver. PNC Bank, Bank of America and Bank of New York Mellon can be classified, on average, as the main positive "fear" receivers in the system. The highest positive pairwise connectedness is from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley (17.76%) and, second, from Morgan Stanley to Goldman Sachs (12.18%) again.
On the bottom panel of Table 5 , we observe that the negative "fear" connectedness is even lower, being equal to 26.22%, which implies that only a quarter of all financial institutions' negative "fear" is generated by "fear" transmission within the system. The on-diagonal elements point to an even stronger role of the own shocks. The range of the negative directional FROM values is even narrower than in the case of the positive volatility analysis, with the lowest value equal to 19.26% for Citigroup and the highest value equal to 34.97% for Morgan Stanley.
The negative directional TO connectedness is also quite low, except for Goldman Sachs, which transferred to the system most of the negative "fear" , making it the main net volatility transmitter. PNC Bank is found to have the Notes: The table contains forecast error variance decomposition computed for the VIX + andVIX − indexes for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. Elements in the off-diagonal entries are the pairwise directional connectedness, while the diagonal elements (in grey) are the financial institutions' own variance. The off-diagonal row and column sums to TO and FROM directional connectedness, respectively. The NET row at the bottom is the difference between TO and FROM. The bottom-right element is the total connectedness index in the considered system. Selected VAR lags = 4 and Forecast Horizon = 12 days. The selected time period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017. lowest negative directional TO (10.87%), thus being one of the main net negative "fear" receivers, alongside Bank of New York Mellon and American Express. American Express changed its role from positive "fear" transmitter to negative "fear" receiver. In addition, the highest pairwise value of negative "fear" connectedness is found to be the one from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley (15.69%), followed by the pair from Morgan Stanley to Goldman Sachs (10.39%).
Overall, these results show how some of the selected financial institutions change their roles from a net receiver to a net transmitter, or vice versa, when comparing aggregate to positive and negative implied volatility (or "fear" ) shocks, confirming asymmetries in the transmission mechanism. For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase is found to be an aggregate "fear" transmitter, whereas separate VIX + and VIX − show that it is found to be a positive and negative "fear" receiver. The opposite is found for Citigroup. Morgan Stanley's role as a "fear" transmitter is confirmed in the aggregate and negative case, while it is also found to be a positive "fear" receiver. Goldman
Sachs is found to be the main winner in the financial sector, being an average "fear" transmitter, regardless of the nature of the volatility measure. PNC Bank, Bank of America and Bank of New York Mellon are, on the other hand, the weakest banks, given that they receive volatility from the system, regardless of the volatility measure.
The static picture may hide the different roles that positive and negative implied volatility (or "fear" ) connect-edness have in relation to the different market periods. However, the next section 5.2 provides a more in-depth understanding of their separate roles by studying their changes over time.
Asymmetric Fear Connectedness: Time Dynamics
In Figure 3 , we depict the fear connectedness indexes as computed from equation (10) and the asymmetric fear connectedness as computed from equation (15) Figure 3 confirms our preliminary finding that the connectedness due to positive "fear" plays a stronger role in the financial sector for the entire study period. However, in some specific periods, such as during the two recessions and during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the negative "fear" connectedness increases. The peak in negative connectedness during 2006 can be justified by the extreme uncertainty about a possible U.S. housing bubble burst. The bottom plot in the Figure 3 shows that positive and negative "fear" connectedness become more intertwined depending on recessions, turbulent periods or crises. Overall, it appears that positive "fear" is the main factor to understand how the volatility of single U.S. financial companies is transmitted. 
Asymmetric Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
In this section, we analyze how the financial institutions can be classified as net positive or net negative "fear" transmitters or receivers. Tables 6 and 7 rank the ten main banks according to their cumulative net positive and net negative "fear" transmitter or receiver role. We rank the financial institutions according to the results gathered every year, every two years, during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, and over the total time frame.
From Table 6 , J.P. Morgan Chase confirms its role as a main positive "fear" transmitter within the system at an annual frequency, being the top ranking transmitter over half of the period. Citigroup follows as a second main positive "fear" transmitter on an annual basis. On the other hand, Bank of New York Mellon is found as the main positive "fear" receiver on an annual basis, with PNC Bank and Morgan Stanley ranking next. Repeating this exercise at the two-year grouping, overall, the same ranking is obtained, namely, J.P. Morgan Chase is found to be the main positive "fear" transmitter and Bank of New York Mellon the main positive "fear" receiver. The cumulative main net positive connectedness transmitter for the pre-crisis period is found to be J.P. Morgan Chase, with Goldman Sachs contributing almost the same amount. In the pre-crisis period, the main positive "fear" receiver is Bank of New York Mellon, followed by Morgan Stanley. Interestingly, during the global financial crisis, Wells Fargo is classified as a main positive "fear" transmitter, while Bank of New York Mellon is found to be a positive "fear" receiver. For the post-financial crisis period, J.P. Morgan Chase is found to be the main positive "fear" transmitter, followed by Citigroup, while PNC Bank is found to be the main positive "fear" receiver. The total sample cumulative ranking shows, overall, that J.P. Morgan Chase is the main positive "fear" transmitter, whereas Bank of New York Mellon is the main positive "fear" receiver within the U.S. banking system. Table 7 shows the ranking for the net negative "fear" connectedness. The annual ranking highlights a main contribution in the negative "fear" transmission from Goldman Sachs, followed by J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells
Fargo. American Express played the main role in terms of annual negative "fear" reception, followed by Morgan
Stanley. For the two-year ranking, we find, again, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo to be the main negative "fear" transmitters and a clearer role for American Express and Bank of New York Mellon as negative "fear" receivers. The pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods rankings indicate that Bank of America, Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan Chase had the main negative "fear" transmitter roles, respectively. Wells Fargo is found to be the main negative "fear" receiver in the pre-crisis period, Citigroup during the financial crisis and American Express in the post-crisis period. Over the total sample period, the negative cumulative "fear" connectedness picture points to J.P. Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs as the main transmitters of negative "fear"
to the system and to American Express as the main financial institution receiving negative "fear" from the system.
Figures ?? and ?? in Appendix B complement the analysis and show which U.S. banks contribute more to the positive and negative "fear" connectedness, respectively, over time.
Case Study: Goldman Sachs
Since Goldman Sachs has been identified as the main "fear" transmitter in the financial sector, we investigate this bank more closely, reporting the dynamics of the connectedness in response to systematic and specific events.
We present the net directional "fear" connectedness indexes, together with the net AFC of the single financial institution in order to determine their asymmetric behavior over the studied time period. In the Goldman Sachs case, we denote the net positive "fear" as C + GS,NET and the net negative "fear" as C − GS,NET . Appendix C contains similar case studies of other financial institutions that are found to be the top net aggregate "fear" transmitters and receivers in our previous analysis. The same notation will apply for these banks, and major specific company events, along with systematic events, will be reported for the selected time period. Motivated by the previous results, we test the predictive power of our asymmetric connectedness measures in forecasting future macroeconomic conditions, as well as the potential increase in uncertainty. Our hypothesis is that forward-looking connectedness measures may result in an early warning tool to forecast the declines in the U.S. macroeconomic conditions or increases in financial and economic uncertainty. We select the following monthly indicators, which reflect the macroeconomic and economic conditions, such as the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) Business Condition Index (Aruoba et al., 2009) , the Chicago FED National Activity Index, CFNAI, the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI) (see Hakkio et al., 2009) , the NBER recession period dummy variable and the U.S. Industrial Production (IP) 9 . As uncertainty proxies, we select the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index (see Baker et al., 2016) , the GeoPolitical Risk (GPR) index by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) , the Economic Uncertainty Index (EUI) by Bali et al. (2014) , the CBOE implied volatility index (VIX ) and the average conditional volatility based on GARCH(1,1) of some U.S. macroeconomic variables (AVGVOL) 10 .
The first set of equations concerns the macroeconomic indicators (MacroInd), while the second regards the uncertainty indicators (UncertInd). We control for the 1-to 12-month lags of endogenous variables.
9 They are collected according to their available sample, at a monthly frequency, from the following sources: the Aruoba-DieboldScotti (ADS) Business Condition Index tracks real business conditions at a high frequency and it is based on economic indicators. The information is collected from: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/ business-conditions-index. The Chicago FED National Activity Index (CFNAI) is a monthly index that tracks the overall economic activity and the inflationary pressure. It is computed as a weighted average of 85 monthly indicators and it is collected from: https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/cfnai/index. The Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI) is a measure of stress in the U.S. financial system and is based on eleven financial market variables (see Hakkio et al., 2009) . It is collected from https:// www.kansascityfed.org/research/indicatorsdata/kcfsi. The NBER recession period dummy variable for the U.S. tracks recession(1) and expansion (0) periods according to NBER and is available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC. The monthly growth rate of the U.S. Industrial Production (IP) measures the real output for all the facilities in the U.S. and is collected from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INDPRO. 10 The EPU index by Baker et al. (2016) is computed from news associated with the ten most important American newspapers, reflecting the concerns and uncertainty around specific economic or political events. It is collected from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/. The GeoPolitical Risk index by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) (GPR) is computed in a similar way to EPU from newspaper articles associated with geopolitical events, wars, terrorist attacks or international conflicts. It is available at https://www2.bc.edu/ matteo-iacoviello/gpr.htm. The Economic Uncertainty Index (EUI) by Bali et al. (2014) is a measure of economic uncertainty based on the time-varying conditional volatility of macroeconomic and financial variables, such as the default spread, term spread, shortterm interest rate, dividend yield, equity market index, inflation, unemployment rate and GDP available at http://faculty.msb.edu/ tgb27/workingpapers.html. VIX is the CBOE implied volatility index, while AVGVOL is computed, in a similar way as in , as the average time-varying GARCH(1,1) conditional volatility of some macroeconomic variables common in the literature. In this paper, we select the default spread as difference between the BAA-rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds (DEF), the term spread as the difference between the 10-year T-bond and the three-month T-bill yield (TERM), the relative short-term interest rate, which is computed as a difference between the three-month T-bill rate and its annual moving average (RREL), the industrial production monthly growth rate (IP) and the inflation rate computed by the U.S. consumer price index (INF). All these variables are collected from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
where MacroInd ∈ {ADS, CFNAI, KCSFI, NBER, IP} is one of the macroeconomic indicator variables, and
UncertInd ∈ {EPU, GPR, EUI, VIX, AVGVOL} is one of the uncertainty proxies for h = 1, ..., 12 horizons up to one year. For the NBER recession dichotomous variable, a probit regression is fitted and the z-statistics are Tables 8 and 9 display the results for the predictive power of the fear connectedness indexes for the future macroeconomic conditions and uncertainty indicators, respectively. Table 8 reports the results of the predicting regressions estimated through equations (19) and (20). First, β refers to the effect of the total fear connectedness C t on the selected macroeconomic indicators. Second, β − , and β + break the effect into negative and positive parts, respectively. Our main hypothesis is that decomposed connectedness measures C − t and C + t carry additional predictive information compared to the aggregate C t .
Predicting Macroeconomic Conditions and Uncertainty
One of the first observations made from Table 8 is that C − t and C + t are able to predict the ADS Business condition index from 4 to 12 months and from 4 to 10 months in advance, respectively. Negative and positive information further predicts CFNAI from 3 to 10 months in advance and from 3 to 9 months in advance, respectively.
In addition, C − t can signal a recession early, providing an alarm a few months before the aggregate C t , emphasizing the importance of investors' expectations contained in the put options. C − t is also found to be the only connectedness index that can predict short-mid future levels of KCSFI. In contrast to the decomposed connectedness, the aggregate connectedness C t is unable to predict the ADS Business condition index, the CFNAI, the KCSFI and the industrial production, while showing only a long horizon predictability power for future recessions. Table 9 shows the results of the predictive regressions estimated through equations (22) and (23). Both C t and C + t contain predictive information for the EPU index, from 4 to 6 months ahead and from 3 to 5 months ahead, respectively. C − t has predictive information for the EPU index, one year ahead. Future geopolitical risk is predicted by all the three C t indexes, but at different horizons. C t forecasts well the future level of AVGVOL up to one year, while C − t from 8 to 12 months ahead, respectively. The C t measure is unable to predict only future economic uncertainty (EUI) and future levels of the VIX index. The latter is only predicted by a mixture of information from C + t and, especially, C − t . C − t is the only measure with predictive power on EUI.
Our results are comparable to findings of , who introduced a Catastrophic Risk in the Financial Sector (CATFIN) measure and found that it is able to predict future macroeconomic conditions. 11 We include a CATFIN measure in all regressions as a control variable. We find that the results are robust and do not materially change the significance of connectedness measures. This finding leads us to the conclusion that information contained in connectedness indexes carries additional information to CATFIN. Different information content can also be seen from the low correlation of the CATFIN and connectedness indexes 12 .
Overall, we find that in contrast to aggregate connectedness, decomposed indexes carry predictive information for the macroeconomic indicators. This finding is in line with recent literature on the decomposed variance risk premium (e.g. Kilic and Shaliastovich, 2018) assessing how the mixture of information coming from the decomposed premia is more helpful to predict, in their case, future asset returns. We have conducted several robustness checks on the predictive exercise as well; however, our results appear to be robust 13 .
We perform the same predictive exercise for both the macroeconomic and the uncertainty indicators by grouping the information contained in C − t and C + t as a ratio between the two to check whether we can still obtain the same predictability results with a more compact and parsimonious equation. Results for this exercise are reported in Table 10 . We can observe that the C − t /C + t ratio can predict macroeconomic activity for long horizons.
11 Catastrophic Risk in the Financial Sector (CATFIN) measure by is constructed using nonparametric and parametric approaches based on value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) methods. The parametric distributions used to estimate the 99% VaR and the 1% ES are the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) and the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED). The nonparametric methods are measured as a cut-off point of the left tail minus one percentile of the monthly excess returns for the VaR and as an average of the extreme financial firms returns beyond the 1% nonparametric VaR. CATFIN is then constructed as an average of the three VaR and ES measures. 12 The complete set of results on this predictive exercise when we control for CATFIN is available from the authors upon request. 13 We have also changed the construction methodology for the connectedness indexes. We have performed the same predictive exercise by considering Ct indexes as computed in sections 4.2 and 5.2, considering a dynamic framework with a rolling window length equal to 200 days. The results are similar to those presented here, with C − t and C + t still playing a major role compared to the total Ct. We have replaced the 200-day window length with 100 days finding that the results still hold; however, they shift a few months. In order to avoid this information mismatch due to the rolling window length, we decided to compute quarterly static Ct for every quarter and linearly interpolate them in order to obtain monthly measures that match the selected macro and uncertainty indicators. The results were still robust with, in some cases, predictability power spanning from the very short-horizon until month 10. The same major roles for C − t and C + t are found compared with Ct, remaining robust to all the exercises we have tried. However, we decided to discard this methodology due to the interpolation approximation and to present results regarding our Ct indexes computed quarterly, end-of-the-month, and rolled for every month. We also controlled for CATFIN in all these other cases, finding that results remain robust and provide additional information. This finding is also confirmed by the fact that, with regard to the 200-day rolling window, for instance, we find that CATFIN is positively but weakly correlated with our connectedness measures, namely, 0.05, 0.24 and 0.23, for Ct, C t , respectively and some macroeconomic conditions indicators such as the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADS), the Chicago FED National Activity Index (CFNAI), the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI), the NBER recession dummy variable (NBER) and the Industrial Production Index (IP). For NBER, a Probit regression is estimated, and the z-statistics are reported in parentheses, while for the other variables, OLS regressions are estimated, and Newey (1987) t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significant relationships are highlighted in bold. All the connectedness indexes are computed quarterly and rolled every month, matching the monthly variables we want to predict for the sample from 10-2000 to 12-2017. and some uncertainty proxies, such as the Economic and Policy Uncertainty (EPU), the GeoPolitical Risk Index (GPR), the Economic Uncertainty Index (EUI), the CBOE VIX index and the macroeconomic conditional volatility average (AVGVOL). OLS regressions are estimated, and Newey (1987) t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significant relationships are highlighted in bold. All the connectedness indexes are computed quarterly and rolled every month, matching the monthly variables we want to predict for the sample from 10-2000 to 12-2017. Notes: Panel A presents the results of the predictive regressions estimated through equation 21 between C − t /C + t and some macroeconomic conditions indicators ,such as the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADS), the Chicago FED National Activity Index (CFNAI), the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI), the NBER recession dummy variable (NBER) and the Industrial Production Index (IP). Panel B presents the results of the predictive regressions estimated through equation 24 between C − t /C + t and some uncertainty proxies such as the Economic and Policy Uncertainty (EPU), the GeoPolitical Risk Index (GPR), the Economic Uncertainty Index (EUI), the CBOE VIX index and the macroeconomic conditional volatility average (AVGVOL). For NBER, a Probit regression is estimated and the z-statistics are reported in parentheses, while for the other variables, OLS regressions are estimated and Newey (1987) t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significant relationships are highlighted in bold. All the connectedness indexes are computed quarterly and rolled every month, matching the monthly variables we want to predict for the sample from 10-2000 to 12-2017. For instance, the C − t and C + t ratio can predict the ADS Index, from 3 to 12 months in advance, the CFNAI from 3 to 12 months in advance, the NBER recession period from 4 to 12 months in advance and the IP growth rate from 3 up to 12 months in advance. The ratio is found to have short-term predictive power in relation to KCSFI, instead carrying predictive information for only one and two months. From Table 10 , we infer that the C − t /C + t ratio cannot predict the EUI and AVGVOL, while it can predict the EPU index and the GPR index 3-4 and from 5 to 10 months ahead, respectively. The ratio predicts VIX up to 7 months. Results for the C − t and C + t ratio show that, in some cases, such as for EUI and AVGVOL, the ratio shows no predictive power. Thus, it can be concluded that when information contained in C − t and C + t are kept separate and added to the same regression equation, they are better able to predict future levels of economic activity and, particularly, of uncertainty proxies.
Conclusion
Asymmetric implied volatility connectedness measures were constructed in this paper to study the transmission of different information on "fears" extracted from the two sides of the stock options market in the U.S. financial sector, as represented by the ten main financial institutions in the U.S. The decomposed connectedness measures computed from these financial institutions' VIX indexes provided forward-looking valuable information reflecting future investors' expectations.
The decomposed C − t and C + t measures are found to play an important and timely role in signaling changes in future macroeconomic activity or uncertainty indicators. Thus, they can be considered forward-looking warning tools that will complement the already-existing toolbox of systemic risk measures. Our empirical analysis points out that the information extracted from C − t and C + t serves as a better and more timely predictive tool than the aggregate C t , especially for macroeconomic downturns and activity measured by ADS, CFNAI and industrial production. Moreover, C − t is also found to be a early signaling tool with regard to recessions, VIX and EUI since changes in these factors are found to be reflected more strongly in the U.S. put options market.
We highlighted how financial institutions play different roles as positive/negative "fear" transmitters/receivers.
From a systemic risk point of view, our new methodology provides a richer and more detailed picture of bank networks. For instance, we identify banks that are predominantly receivers of "fear" , as well banks transmitting "fear" in the financial system, and we identify the role played over time by a top bank like Goldman Sachs. This exercise exacerbates even further the precious role that separate "fear" connectedness indexes play in offering separate information when employed to predict future levels of macroeconomic activity or uncertainty indicators.
Having an ex ante monitoring tool for systemic risk might be particularly useful for financial stability and market supervision. There is significant predictive information in the implied positive and negative connectedness indexes related to future macroeconomic activity or uncertainty. Moreover, being able to identify the more systemically important financial institutions can be helpful for preventing the spread of volatility and risk within the system, preparing the financial institutions and policymakers to implement prudent operations in advance.
Appendix A Positive and Negative Implied Volatilities
The time dynamics of implied volatility series is illustrated in Figure A1 . Overall, all the ten financial institutions' volatility indexes spike in alignment with the global financial crisis, which is found to be a common denominator of uncertainty and volatility increases. There are also more idiosyncratic jumps in volatility indexes. In Figure A6 , with regard to Bank of America, we observe that the net positive "fear" , C 
